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THE REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
-CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
In June of 1970 a black reporter for the New York Times was held in
contempt of court for refusing to testify as to information he had gathered
form officials of the Black Panther Party concerning the Party's activities
and beliefs. Asserting that he was entitled to a privilege not to divulge
confidential information relayed to him in the course of his profession,
Earl Caldwelli took his case first to a California district court and then to
a United States court of appeals where he won an impressive victory.1
This note will examine the nature of the newsman's privilege with particu-
lar emphasis on the litigation involving Mr. Caldwell.
I. THE REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE AND THE
COLLISION OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
Unlike other privileges such as the attorney-client and physician-patient
privileges the newsman's privilege has not been recognized at common
law. However, at least fourteen states have enacted protective statutes
which guarantee the reporter either an absolute or qualified privilege to re-
fuse to disclose confidential information or sources. 2 To date, newsmen
asserting the statutory privilege have met with little success although
courts frequently have recognized, at least implicitly, that under certain
conditions a qualified (but not an absolute) privilege may be granted. Put
simply, the qualified privilege allows the witness to refuse to divulge con-
fidential information only when the interest to be served by affording this
protection outweighs the public's interest in compulsory testimony. The
competing interests involved in the reporter privilege area are freedom of
the press and the effective and fair administration of justice. Whenever
the privilege is asserted, these values must be balanced one against the
other. This, balancing process is a sensitive and difficult task, for the inter-
ests in conflict are of the highest priority in our legal system.
The broad protective sweep of the first amendment as it relates to the
press in the gathering of news is Well documented.3 In our legal hierarchy
of values, first amendment freedoms occupy a preferred position.' None-
theless, courts have often stated the rule that the first amendment is not
an absolute. Thus, in the area of the newsman's privilege, freedom of the
I Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
2 D'Alemberle, Journalists Under the Axe: Projection of Confidential Sources of Information,
6 HARv. J. LEGIS. 307, 322-330 (1968-69).
3 Assodated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
4 See, e.g., Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
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press must be tempered by considerations of public interest in compelling
testimony before courts of law. Whenever the privilege is asserted, these
values collide. Thus far, courts have tipped the scales in favor of compul-
sory testimony and have denied the qualified privilege.
Compulsory testimony, like freedom of the press, is a fundamental prin-
ciple in our form of government, and a vital element of due process. The
rule is that, unless especially privileged or excepted, every citizen has a
duty to give his testimony. This duty is owing to the public which, as Wig-
more suggests, "has a right to every man's evidence."5  Put another way,
every litigant must be assured the aid of the court in requiring the atten-
dance and testimony of witnesses. The Supreme Court defined the scope of
the duty of compulsory testimony in Blair v. United States:
. .. [Ilt is dearly recognized that the giving of testimony and the atten-
dance upon court or grand jury in order to testify are public duties which
every person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to per-
form . . . the witness is bound not only to attend but to tell what he
knows in answer to questions framed for the purpose of bringing out the
truth of the matter under inquiry.6
The court in Blair recognizes that this rule is subject both to the consti-
tutional exemption from being compelled to be a witness against oneself,
and to the various privileges afforded by law which shield confidential
matters from compulsory disclosure.7  Thus, like the principle of freedom
of the press, the duty of compulsory testimony is not absolute, there being
allowable exemptions "grounded in a substantial individual interest which
has been found, through centuries of experience, to outweigh the public
interest in the search for truth. ' 8
II. THE PRE-CALD WELL PRIVILEGE CASES
Since the decision in Garland v. Torre,' the first case in which the
reporter privilege was asserted on first amendment grounds, courts pre-
sented with the question have been faced with the delicate task of balanc-
ing two values of high priority in our system of government. In that 1958
case, Judy Garland brought action against the Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. (CBS) in district court. Her complaint set out two claims, one
for breach of contract, and the other for allegedly false and defamatory
5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDEN cE §§ 2190-92 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
6 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 278, 281-282 (1919). See also, Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932).
7 The common law recognized a husband-wife privilege and an attorney-client privilege.
States have recognized by statute a priest-penitent and doctor-patient privilege. J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 2285-96 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
8 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
) Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. deuied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
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statements about her which were made, according to newspaper columnist
Marie Torre, by a "network executive." In her column, titled "TV-Radio
Today," Miss Torre attributed to the CBS source several statements about
Judy Garland which the singer-actress alleged were highly damaging to her
career. In discovery proceedings, the columnist refused to reveal the iden-
tity of the network executive. Subsequently, proceedings were instituted
in federal district court to compel Miss Torre to disclose the name. When
she refused, the district court entered an order holding her in contempt.
This order was upheld on appeal by the second circuit.
The second circuit in Torre presented a classic characterization of the
competing interests involved in the reporter-source privilege question.
Potter Stewart, Circuit Judge at the time, stated:
What must be determined is whether the interest to be served by com-
pelling the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies some im-
pairment of [the] First Amendment Freedom (emphasis added).1O
This is the standard by which other courts have guided their thought, for it
states succinctly the nature of the interests in conflict and emphasizes, at
the same time, the importance of judging each case on its own merits; that
is, the test is to be applied according to the particular circumstances under
which the privilege is asserted.
The columnist contended, in Torre, that to compel her to reveal the
source of her information, presented to her in confidence, would be to in-
croach upon the freedom of the press for forced disclosure, which she
maintained, "would impose an important practical restraint on the flow of
news from news sources to news media and would thus diminish pro tanto
the flow of news to the public."" While the second circuit agreed that
such a restraint might indeed result if Miss Torre were ordered to testify,
nonetheless it emphasized that no freedoms are absolute. From this stance,
the court began the task of balancing the competing policies at work and
concluded, in the end, that:
If... freedom of the press-is here involved, we do not hesitate to con-
clude that it too must give place under the Constitution to a paramount
public interest in the fair administration of justice.12
The court held that Marie Torre's constitutional claim was without support
and ruled that she had "no right to refuse an answer. ' 13
In 1961 the question whether a reporter privilege is guaranteed under
freedom of the press was raised again when the Supreme Court of Hawaii
decided In Re Goodfader's Appeal.14  The opinion of the Hawaii court
10 259 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
11 Id. at 547-548.
121d. at 549.
13 Id. at 550.
14367 P.2d 472 (Hawaii 1961).
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echoed much of the language which Stewart had used in Torre and ac-
cepted the circuit court's characterization of competing interests. The
plaintiff in Goodfader brought action against the Honolulu Civil Service
Commission seeking reinstatement as personnel director of the Commis-
sion. The defendants, members of the commission, took the deposition of
a newspaper reporter, Alan L. Goodfader, who had been told that an at-
tempt would be made to fire the plaintiff. On cross-examination, Good-
fader refused to reveal the source of his information. When an order was
issued compelling him to testify, Goodfader again refused, contending that
such an order violated his first amendment rights. The Supreme Court
recognized that compulsory disclosure might, in this case, impinge on free-
dom of the press, but concluded, in language closely paralleling Judge
Stewart's (in Torre):
... [S]uch an impairment may not be considered of a degree sufficient to
outweigh the necessity of maintaining the court's fundamental authority to
compel the attendance of witnesses and to exact their testimony if not
otherwise privileged or protected.15
Another of the progeny of Torre is the 1969 case of Adams v. Associ-
ated Press.6 In November of 1968, school authorities of the San Benito,
Texas school system were investigating the use of marijuana and other
drugs by some of their students. In a news article prepared by KGBT Radio
and Television Stations, Lee Harr, news director for KGBT, reported that
a source close to the school administration claimed that some fifty-one stu-
dents had been expelled from San Benito schools for drug and marijuana
use. Harr further stated that local police had not been called in on the
investigation because the son of a high city official and the daughter of an
elected county official had been involved. This news article was picked up
by an Associated Press reporter who wrote up a news release which was
sent to the Dallas Associated Press office. The news release was changed
and modified to some extent and was eventually "killed," but not before
it had been broadcast by some of the news media who were members of
Associated Press. Plaintiffs, the mayor of San Benito and the County Com-
missioner, sued Associated Press on behalf of their son and daughter, re-
spectively, for defamation of character, alleging Associated Press had made
false and groundless accusations about their children. During the taking
of Harr's deposition, the news director refused to reveal the source of his
information, whereupon the district court issued an order compelling him
to answer.
Not every court presented with this constitutional issue has relied on
merely citing Torre as the court did in Adams, to refute the reporter's
argument. A unique approach to the issue was undertaken by the Oregon
15 Id. at 480.
16 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Texas 1969).
1971]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Supreme Court in State v. Buchanan." In that case, Annette Buchanan, a
writer for a student newspaper, had been granted interviews with seven
persons who claimed to be marijuana users, on condition that she would not
reveal their identities under any circumstances. Using fictitious names, she
reported the results of the interviews. Called before a grand jury investi-
gating the use of marijuana, she refused to disclose the identity of the
seven persons she had talked to. She was fined for contempt and, on appeal,
she pressed the first amendment claim, urging that freedom of the press
necessarily included the freedom to gather news-a freedom which meant
nothing without the privilege to promise anonymity to a confidential in-
formant.
The Oregon court reasoned that news reporters have no special consti-
tutional rights which allow them to gather information which other classes
of citizens may not obtain. To create such rights for those whose business
it is to gather news would be to raise equal privileges and equal protection
questions. Said the court:
Apart from the definitional difficulties in attempting to give constitutional
status to a privilege for qualified news gatherers which presumably would
be denied to less favored classes, there is another objection to discrimina-
tion between news gatherers and other persons. Such a practice would be
potentially destructive of the very freedom that is sought to be preserved
by this appeal.' 8
Although the court in the Oregon case adopted a novel approach to the
constitutional issue, its holding fell squarely in line with Torre and Good-
fader.
These then were the most important cases dealing with the reporter
privilege question prior to the 1970 decisions in Application of Caldwell"
and Caldwell v. United States.20 As significant as these pre-Caldwell deci-
sions were in defining the nature and scope of the balancing test, their
importance was to be overshadowed by a decision announced by the Su-
preme Court in 1964. The decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,2 '
presented what may be regarded as the definitive application of the bal-
ancing test. It is a decision which presents a convincing precedent for a
first amendment-based reporter privilege.
III. NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN: A PROPER
SETTING FOR THE CALD WELL LITIGATION
Sullivan did not deal expressly with the reporter privilege question.
Nonetheless, it is a decision which vitally affects this area and indeed the
17250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1967).
18250 Ore. 244, 249, 436 P.2d 729, 731 (1967).
19 Application of Caldwell, 311 F.Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
20 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
21376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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entire area of constitutional law relative to freedom of the press. The
case involved a libel suit brought by a commissioner of Montgomery, Ala-
bama, charging the New York Times with false statements relative to the
handling of a civil rights demonstration. Prior to Sullivan, the Supreme
Court had held, in a number of instances, that libel was not protected by
the first amendment. Its holding in this case was, however, that certain
kinds of libel were indeed protected by the first amendment, and that
when freedom of the press collides with other rights of high priority in
our legal system, freedom of the press must prevail.
The Court began by delimiting the scope and purpose of the first
amendment:
Thd general proposition that freedom of expression upon public ques-
tions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our de-
cisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, "was fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484. "The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system." Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369.
"[I]t is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not
always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions," Bridges v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 252, 270, and this opportunity is to be afforded for "vig-
orous advocacy" no less than "abstract discussion." N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 429. The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand,
"presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of
a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.
To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our
all." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (D.C.S.D.-
N.Y. 1943) .22
The Court further held that a "... state rule of law is not saved by its
allowance of the defense of truth,"' 3 since "[al rule compelling the critic
of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions-and
to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads
to... 'self-censorship.' "24 Based on these observations, the Supreme Court
formulated the following rule of constitutional law applicable to action
for libel:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that pro-
hibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory false-
hood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
221d. at 269-270.
231d. at 278.
24 Id. at 279.
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was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.5
Since 1964 the Supreme Court has made further inroads on the com-
mon law of libel and has extended the Sullivan doctrine to reach the law
of invasion of privacy. Thus, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Supreme Court
held that a magazine could be found liable for invasion of privacy only
when the statements concerning a person or persons were made with
"knowing or reckless falsity."
The decision in Sullivan is strong and persuasive authority for the
constitutional argument for the newsman's privilege, for it is a decision
which elevates the value of a free press above other protectable interests.
In Sullivan and subsequent decisions, following its lead,2" the need for a
free flow of news has justified the sacrifice of traditional rights of redress
for defamation. First amendment rights assume a paramount importance
in these cases. By analogy to the newsman's privilege question, "the in-
jury to a litigant in a civil action caused by his inability to force a news-
man to identify his confidential source is justified by the superior interest
in the dissemination of news. 27 Because the radiations of Sullivan so
directly touched the reporter privilege area, that case and its progeny be-
came an important weapon in Earl Caldwell's fight for the constitutional
privilege he asserted. It provided a proper setting for the Caldwell action.
Earl Caldwell was on permanent assignment by the New York Times
to cover the Black Panthers. He became in time something of an expert
in Panther activities. It was during the course of his assignment to cover
the party that he was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury which
was investigating the Black Panthers. He was ordered to appear and to
bring with him notes, papers and tape recordings of interviews reflecting
statements made by Black Panther officials. Caldwell filed a motion to
quash the subpoena, fearing that the relationship he had established with
the militant group would be jeopardized if he were compelled to testify.
A hearing was held in a California district court and the motion to quash
was denied on the grounds that "every man" has a duty to testify before
the grand jury. However, District Court Judge Zirpoli issued a protective
order, having found no showing by the government of a compelling or
overriding interest such as to require the reporter's testimony.28 The pro-
tective order was based on the court's finding that the confidential rela-
tionship which Caldwell shared with the Black Panther Party would be
severely damaged by compelling the reporter to testify; damage to that re-
-25 1 .'at 279-280.
26-See Assodated Press v. Walker,-388 U.S. 130 (1967); Beckley Newspaper v. Hanks, 389
U.S. 81 (1967); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
27 Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18, 35 (1969-70).
2 8 Applicadon of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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lationship, the court maintained, would impair Caldwell's ability to
"gather, analyze and publish news" concerning the Panthers. The protec-
tive order directed, in substance, that Caldwell "shall not be required to
reveal confidential associations, sources or information received, developed
or maintained by him as a professional journalist in the course of his efforts
to gather news for dissemination to the public through the press or other
news media." 9  The order further excused him from answering questions
concerning statements made to him by Black Panther Party members, un-
less such statements were given to him for publication.
Following the filing of a notice of appeal by Caldwell, and the dis-
missal of that appeal, a new subpoena was directed to Caldwell. Again
Caldwell filed a motion to quash, which motion was dismissed by Judge
Zirpoli, and another protective order was issued, identical to the first pro-
tective order, but expressly directing Caldwell to appear before the grand
jury. Caldwell refused to appear and was held in contempt. He then
appealed to the second circuit.
The issue presented to the court of appeals in Caldwell v. United States
was not whether the first amendment required protection in the form of
a qualified privilege, but whether the protection of the witness should ex-
tend to excusing him from appearing before the grand jury. The district
court had held that the government had shown no compelling or over-
riding national interest for Caldwell's testimony. This finding, however,
did not satisfy the appellant. It was Caldwell's position that first amend-
ment protection of the confidential relationship he enjoyed with the Black
Panther Party was ineffective and illusory if he could be compelled to ap-
pear behind the closed doors of the grand jury room. His appearance,
Caldwell urged, would destroy the trust and confidence he had built up
over the years with members of the Party. The second circuit agreed with
Caldwell's position and held that he should not be compelled to appear.
The courts in Application of Caldwell and Caldwell v. United States
employed the balancing of interests test which had been so convincingly
applied in Sullivan. Though the circumstances of the cases were dissimilar,
the interests sought to be protected were basically the same. In Sullivan
and the Caldwell cases, first amendment rights assume a preferred status.
Other rights are sacrificed in order to guarantee the preservation of the
free press and the unfettered gathering and reporting of news. In these
cases the scales are tipped in favor of the newsman. We have discussed
the balancing process in Sullivan. We turn now to a discussion of the
manner in which the test is applied in the cases involving Earl Caldwell.
The influence of Sullivan in this context cannot be minimized.
20 Id. at 362.
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IV. CALD WELL AND THE BALANCING TEST
In both Application of Caldwell and Caldwell v. United States, the
task before the court was the same "delicate and difficult task" which had
faced other courts presented with the issue of the newsman's privilege:
namely that of balancing the competing policy issues. In the court of ap-
peals, Judge Merrill employed the Torre formula in an effort to arrive at
the proper balance. On one side of the scales he placed the need for an
"untrammeled press":
The need for an untrammeled press takes on special urgency in times of
widespread protest and dissent. In such times the First Amendment pro-
tections exist to maintain communication with dissenting groups and to
provide the public with a wide range of information about the nature of
protest and heterodoxy. ..0
With this view of the nature of the opposing principles involved in
the privilege question, the second circuit refuted the government's con-
tention that because the Black Panthers constantly "exploit the facilities
of the news media" and depend on the mass media for their publicity,
denial of the privilege would result in a serious check on the flow of the
news. The court felt this argument was not responsive to the constitu-
tional claim asserted by Caldwell for, as Judge Merrill puts it, it was "not
enough that the public's knowledge of groups such as the Black Panthers
should be confined to their deliberate public pronouncements or distant
news accounts of their occasional dramatic forays into the public view." 3'
The first amendment exists, Judge Merrill continued, to maximize the
amount of information available to the public, not to insure merely that
channels of communication are available to groups such as the Panthers.
On the other side of the scales, the court of appeals placed the grand
jury's investigative power. While recognizing the historic tradition of
the grand jury and the established duty of the citizens to appear before the
grand jury and to give testimony, it concluded that in Caldwell's case, re-
quiring testimony of this witness would be tantamount to converting him
into "an investigative agent of the Government.""2 Imposing such a gov-
ernmental function on the witness could not be justified, in the opinion of
the court, "where it has not been shown to be essential to the Grand Jury
inquiry."33  This novel interpretation of the role of a newsman led the
court to affirm the ruling of the district court that the first amendment
required a qualified privilege for Caldwell.
The court of appeals next considered a question never before presented
to a court deciding the reporter privilege issue: namely, may appellant be
30 434 F.2d 1081, 1084-1085 (9th Cir. 1970).
31434 F.2d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 1970).
32434 F.2d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1970).
S3Id.
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excused from even appearing before the grand jury because of his peculiar
relationship with his source? This question of course contemplated a priv-
ilege far broader than the qualified privilege not to reveal confidential in-
formation. The privilege sought was not to attend the hearing at all and
not to answer any questions, including questions relating to non-confidential
information. Despite the government's vigorous opposition to the grant-
ing of such a broad privilege, the court held that Caldwell could not be
compelled to appear. Judge Merrill cautioned, however, that "the rule of
the case is a narrow one" since "not every source ... is as sensitive as the
Black Panther Party has been shown to be..."3'
As noted earlier, courts deciding the constitutional question have agreed
that in any given case whether or not the argument in favor of the privi-
lege will be accepted depends on the outcome of a balancing test. 5 An
essential element of that test, as set forth by the court of appeals in Torre,
is that the competing interests must be weighed in terms of the particular
context in which they are asserted. That is, the test must be undertaken
with the view in mind that the opposing policy interests will have rela-
tively more or less weight depending on the peculiar circumstances of the
case. Both the district court in Application of Caldwell"8 and the higher
court in Caldwell v. United States seemed to be aware of this require-
ment of the balancing test. Judge Zirpoli's issuance of the protective order
was based on a finding that there was "no compelling or overriding" inter-
est to tip the scales in favor of compelling disclosures. Likewise, court of
appeals Judge Merrill reached his decision to excuse Caldwell from appear-
ing before the grand jury only after a careful and sensitive analysis of the
consequences which might result if Caldwell were forced to testify.
Throughout his opinion, Judge Merrill expresses concern for the possible
damage to the "tenuous and unstable" relationship between the reporter
and the Panthers which Caldwell's mere presence might cause. He states:
The relationship depends upon a trust and confidence that is constantly
subject to reexamination and that depends in turn on actual knowledge of
how news and information imparted have been handled and on continuing
reassurance that the handling has been discreet.37
The court concluded from the facts that there was nothing to which
the appellant could testify that was not protected by the order of the dis-
trict court. Consequently, Judge Merrill reasoned that no benefit could be
derived from requiring the reporter to appear before the grand jury. Quite
to the contrary, the Judge reasons that because of the secrecy surrounding
this grand jury probe and because of the uncertainty which such a probe
34 434 F.2d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 1970).
3 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961); and Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
36 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal 1970).
37 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1970).
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introduces "in the minds of those who fear a betrayal of their confi-
dences, ' 3 8 the mere appearance of the appellant might result in irreparable
injury to the relationship between him and the Panthers. To risk such in-
jury could not be justified unless the government could show a compelling
need for the reporter's testimony. The court felt such a need had not been
shown, and that Caldwell's appearance would be of no possible benefit to
the grand jury. The court states:
To destroy appellant's capacity as news gatherer for such a return hardly
makes sense. Since the costs to the public of excusing [CaldweU's] at-
tendance is so slight, it may be said that there is here no public interest
of real substance in competition with the First Amendment freedoms that
are jeopardized.39
The court of appeals makes it abundantly clear that "the rule of this
case is a narrow one"; 40 it makes no attempt to define the nature of the
burden required of the party seeking disclosure nor of the kinds of situa-
tions which would meet that burden. Clearly, this is the appropriate stance
in view of Supreme Court pronouncements on the nature of the decision
making process as it relates to reporter privilege.41 The rule of each case
must always be the narrow rule. But the court does lay down a general
rule to the effect that a court considering the question whether to extend
the privilege to excusing appearance before an inquisitorial body must ap-
ply the same test which governs determination of whether the narrower
qualified privilege should be allowed. In both situations, the government
must demonstrate "'a compelling need for the witness's presence before
judicial process properly can issue to require attendance." 42
Implicit in the opinion of Judge Merrill is at least one other require-
ment of the balancing process. That requirement is that in all cases the
presumption will be made that freedom of the press extends protection to
the newsman in the form of a qualified privilege. The initial determina-
tion which must be made by a court deciding the privilege question is, as
Judge Stewart put it in Torre, "whether the interest to be served by com-
pelling the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies some im-
pairment of this First Amendment freedom [of the press]. '43  Evidence
that the testimony sought is essential to the success of the proceeding and
that such testimony is required in order to protect vital public interests
must be produced by the party seeking disclosure in order to rebut the pre-
sumption of first amendment protection. This is the approach most likely
s8Id.
39 434 F.2d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 1970).
40434 F.2d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 1970).
41 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
42434 F.2d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 1970).
43259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1958).
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to prevent unnecessary and costly impairment of the free dissemination
and gathering of the news.
V. THE MEANING OF "COMPELLING JUSTIFICATION"
Just resolution of the question of the constitutional privilege by use of
the balancing test depends upon an analytically precise definition of the
interests in collision in any given case. Of course, since the nature of these
interests may vary widely from case to case, it is not possible to formulate
specific rules which should govern the outcome of the court's test. Still,
the court should keep in mind certain fundamental criteria necessary to a
proper determination of which of the competing interests should prevail.
Certainly, phrases such as "compelling interest" and "fair administration
of justice" are of little benefit to the courts absent more specific criteria for
determining whether first amendment rights must prevail over the interest
of the public in compulsory testimony. Because of the importance of the
interests at stake in the privilege question, generalized descriptions of com-
peting interests will not suffice to insure that first amendment rights are
maximized and the flow of the news is not wrongfully impeded. The fo1i
lowing criteria may be helpful to a court in deciding which of the interests
must prevail in any given case:
.. the nature of the proceeding, the merits of the claim or defense, the
adequacy of the remedy otherwise available, the relevancy of the source,
and the possibility of establishing by other means that which the source is
offered as tending to prove.44
Thus, in any given case it may be important to consider the nature of the
proceeding-that is, whether it be a civil or criminal case. Arguably, the
interests at stake in a murder trial may be more worthy of protection than
the interests at stake in a trial for libel. For example, suppose that a news-
man's testimony is essential to the defense. Assume that without his testi-
mony the defendant may be sentenced to death. It is not difficult to see
that in such a situation the interest in compelling his testimony would be
greater than it would be in a situation where, for example, the plaintiff in
a civil action needs the newsman's testimony in order to collect damages
for libel. An obviously important criterion to be considered is the merits
of the claim or defense. There would be no justification in compelling a
newsman to reveal a confidential source in order to attempt to substantiate
a patently frivilous claim. Relevancy of the information which the news-
man possesses is a basic criterion for, if the reporter has no information
which is important to the disposition of the case, no purpose would be
served by compelling him to appear before a grand jury. Finally, if the
information which the newsman possesses is confidential but can be ob-
44 D'Alemberle, Journalists Under the Axe, supra note 2 at 339.
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tained from another source, compulsory testimony could not be justified.
Let us examine the extent to which these criteria and others were consid-
ered in the court of appeals' decision in Caldwell.
As has been noted, Caldwell was subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury investigating the activities of a militant organization. The possibility
that criminal prosecutions would follow from the grand jury probe was,
of course, a very real possibility. Thus, the proceedings to which Caldwell
was summoned were of utmost public interest. However, the court of
appeals did not feel that the importance of the proceeding was a factor
sufficiently significant in itself to justify compelling Caldwell to testify be-
fore the grand jury. Rather, the court looked to other factors which they
felt were of relatively more importance. An important consideration in
the view of the court of appeals was the nature of the relationship be-
tween the newsman and his source. The court recognized that the rela-
tionship was a fragile one which depended to an unusual extent on mutual
faith and trust. In this regard, the court referred to an affidavit from
Caldwell in which the reporter asserted that compulsory disclosure would
prevent him and other journalists from being admitted in to Panther
circles. Also noted by the court were affidavits from other newsmen, one
of whom gave a specific example of how in his own personal experience
his testimony before a legally constituted body had had a "chilling effect"
on his relationships with his source.45 Judge Merrill is particularly aware
that militant groups such as the Black Panthers may be far more suspi-
cious of the "establishment press" than other groups. Because of this, he
suggests that special care must be exercised in order to avoid cutting the
tenuous lines of communication between newsmen and these groups. This
criterion-the nature of the relationship between newsman and source-
is one which belongs on the list of criteria which must be considered by
courts presented with the constitutional privilege question.
The court of appeals examines another criterion which must be consid-
ered in the weighing of interests: namely, the relevancy of the informa-
tion which the newsman possesses. Judge Merrill attaches great signifi-
cance to Caldwell's contention that he would have nothing of importance
to say to the grand jury-that is, nothing not protected by the protective
order issued by the district court-if he were compelled to testify. Ac-
cepting the truth of this statement, the court reasons that to order Caldwell
to appear before a secret grand jury investigation would be to compel a
"barren appearance," a performance of no benefit to the grand jury. Es-
pecially in light of the fragile relationship between the reporter and his
source, such a course of action was deemed to be totally unjustified.
4 5 The affidavit of New York Times correspondent Anthony Ripley recounted an instance
in which the S.D.S. refused to allow the reporter to talk to its members because of Ripley's testi-
mony before the Committee on Internal Security of the House of Representatives in Washing-
ton, D.C. before which committee Ripley had been subpoeaned to appear.
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NOTES
The court of appeals examined many of the criteria suggested earlier
and added others in their effort to administer fairly the balancing test.
In so doing, they avoided a pitfall of other courts which have decided the
reporter privilege question. Courts in the past have not defined with suf-
ficient precision the nature of the interests involved. The Torre court, for
example, declined to explain exactly what it meant by the "fair administra-
tion of justice." Furthermore, the court failed to emphasize the extreme
relevancy of the testimony required in order to sustain the plaintiff's claim.
Despite the fair degree of specificity with which the court of appeals
in Caldwell looked at the factors involved in the balancing of policies, it
might have suggested further standards by which the need for compul-
sory testimony could be measured. Though the court did not do so, it is
apparent that additional standards and criteria may be of benefit to courts
pressed with the privilege issue in the future.
The Department of Justice has issued a statement setting forth its
guidelines for subpoenas to the news media. These guidelines are reason-
able and fair and may be helpful to courts in the future. Some of the De-
partment of Justice's guidelines are set out below:
A. There should be sufficient reason to believe that a crime has oc-
curred, from disclosures by nonpress sources. The Department does not
approve utilizing the press as a springboard for investigations.
B. There should be sufficient reason to believe that the information
is essential to a successful investigation .... The subpoena should not be
used to obtain peripheral nonessential or speculative information.
C. The Government should have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain
the information from alternative nonpress sources....
F. Great caution should be observed in requesting subpoena authori-
zation by the Attorney General for unpublished information, or where an
orthodox First Amendment defense is raised or where a serious claim of
confidentiality is alleged....
G. In any event, subpoena should, wherever possible, be directed at
material information regarding a limited subject matter, should cover a
reasonably limited period of time, and should avoid requiring production
of a large volume of unpublished material.46
These criteria provide at least a point of departure, a basic check list to
which reference should be made by a court deciding the privilege question.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional protection of a qualified privilege for newsmen may be
justified under proper circumstances in order to maximize the free gathering
and reporting of news without sacrificing the vital interests which are served
by enforcing the duty of citizens to give testimony. Especially in view of
the decision in Sullivan, a decision which has far-ranging implications in
46 Reprinted from New York Times, Aug. 11, 1970, at 24.
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the whole area of first amendment rights, the constitutional argument
in favor of the privilege appears to be supported. However, whether the
constitutional argument is accepted or not still must depend on the weigh-
ing of interests test. This test, in turn depends on the careful and ex-
haustive examination of the particular circumstances of the case, with ref-
erence to the criteria suggested above. Perhaps there will be other cases of
extreme sensitivity which will require the court to excuse the newsman
from appearance before the court or grand jury, as was done in Caldwell.
In such cases, the question must be left to the sound and impartial discre-
tion of the courts. It is for the courts to determine whether there are
events, circumstances, and conditions which necessitate extending such a
broad and important privilege to members of the news media.
Scott M. Lewis
